Tibet and India's Security: Himalayan Region, Refugees and Sino-India Relation

Email

Whatsapp

Facebook

Pinterest

Twitter

Copy link

As regards Sino-Tibetan relations, the status of Tibet is at the core of the dispute. China maintains that Tibet is an inalienable part of China. Tibetans maintain that Tibet has historically been an independent country. In reality, the conflict over Tibet's status has been a conflict over history. Tibet is a key factor in India-China relations. It is only after the 1950 Chinese occupation of Tibet that India and China came to share the now disputed common border. In recent years, China's military buildup and infrastructure development in Tibet, as well as reported plans to divert or dam rivers that rise in Tibet and flow into India, have raised India's anxieties. Conversely, China's insecurity about Tibet is an important driver of its approach toward India. India has been unable to assuage China's fears about its possible use of the presence of the Dalai Lama in India and its large Tibetan refugee population of about 120,000 to create trouble for China in Tibet. The trigger for the face-off was China's stiff opposition to India laying a key road in the Finger area around the Pangong Tso Lake besides construction of another road connecting the Darbuk-Shayok-Daulat Beg Oldie road in Galwan Valley. The road in the Finger area in Pangong Tso is considered crucial for India to carry out patrol. India has already decided not to stall any border infrastructure projects in eastern Ladakh in view of Chinese protests. Modi has declared that India is open to a diplomatic solution. India has increased its number of troops at the border and issued a statement about China's hindrance of India's normal patrolling patterns, but the rhetoric has been relatively restrained, China has declared the overall situation to be "stable and controllable." It has also announced that the sides would make use of "unimpeded" channels to resolve their issues. This work is essentially useful for scholars researchers social activists academics government functionaries and the general reader alike.

Dr. C. Raghavan, Professor and HoD.Deptt. of Political Science at Rajrani Ambe College Anandpura. He did his Ph.D.in Political Science from Toronto University. He joined the College in 2004 and since then serving the College. He had completed a minor and a major research project under UGC. He has supervised and guided twenty six Research scholars of M.Phil and Ph.D. He has attended several seminars and conferences and presented research papers.

In India, the tumultuous year of 1950 saw the emergence of two factions: one led by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and K.M. Panikkar, his ambassador in Beijing, both obsessed with an imaginary friendship with New China and fixated on the "larger implications for World Peace" for any decision concerning Tibet; the other, which immediately saw the strategic implications for India's frontiers if Delhi let Tibet down, was led by Sardar Patel, the Deputy Prime Minister, with Sir Girija Shankar Bajpai, the Secretary General of the Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations as his main adviser, but also comprised President Rajendra Prasad, C. Rajagopalachari, K.M. Munshi and others. They were fed with reports "from the ground" by Harishwar Dayal, the brilliant Political Officer in Sikkim and Sumul Sinha, the Head of the Indian Mission in Lhasa, two sincere and far- sighted civil servants. At that time, India had a full-fledged Mission in Tibet as well as three Trade Agencies in Gyantse, Yatung and Gartok.

Historically, refugees from Tibet were central to Sino-Indian relations. Now economy and trade may appear to be overtaking it as the first concern, but in soft power terms, India giving shelter to them is inherent to our strategic culture based on soft power.

Much that the Chinese did between 1954 and 1962 was in violation of the 1954 and 1962 was in violation of the 1954 Agreement between India and China on Tibet and the five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence enshrined in it. Instead of mutual respect for each other's territorial India and in violation of India's territorial integrity and sovereignty, remain in occupation of territory well-beyond their own original claim lines in the Aksai Chin region of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. Instead of mutual noninterference, they aided and abeted insurgencies in India.